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Style without Substance, Form qua Function: 
the Non-philosophical Unilateralization of 
Philosophical Style 
THOMAS SUTHERLAND 
" ... we try to make a new wine f!ow into the bottles of 
philosophy, its dominant style, its literary genre, its 
codes of admissibility and, quite simply, perceptibility" 
-François Laruelle, As One: "Non-Philosophy"
Explained to Philosophers 1 
The utilization of style by philosophers has remained a central (if often 
implicit) concern of François Laruelle's work even prior to the 
development of his "non-philosophical" project proper (a rcminder, 
perhaps, of the deconstructionist line of thought from which it departs), at 
the same time that his own writings have been subject to frequent 
critiques regarding their often abstrnse, sibylline stylistic tendencies. It is 
preciscly this question of philosophical style, and the way that wc might 
understand the philosophical usage or appropriation of style through the 
1 François Lamelle, En tant qu'un: La «non-philosophie» éxpliquée au philosophes 
(Paris: Aubier, 1991), p. 182, my translation. 
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lens of Lamelle's non-philosophy - which he in turn describes as "a new 
of thought", external to the strictures of Western philosophy - that I 
wish to in this article.2 More specifically, I will argue that style is 
one of the more helpful problematics through which we might understand 
Lamelle's non-philosophical project (albeit one that he does not often 
thematize in detail), and its hope of effecting within thought "an infinite 
opening that is not closed by a philosophical project or teleology" .3 If we 
take as a starting point Jean-Luc definition of style as "the genre 
of philosophy - the question of how to present and expose philosophy, or, 
to say this in an absolute way, of philosophical exposition", I contend that 
non-philosophy might allow us to make usage of these genres and styles 
in a manner that decouples them from this expositional function. 4 
Differences in style (of writing, tone, argumentation, etc.) are one 
of the primary means of distinguishing individual philosophies from each 
other, and yet, this differentiation, argues Laruelle, occurs within the 
context of a pre-given philosophical indifference - that is to say, it still 
presumes the overall unity and supremacy of qua discourse 
and practice, and the univocity of the syntax and idiom through which 
such difference is 5 Following this line of argument, we might 
then suggest that all philosophies differ in terms of style but stilI 
ultimately conform to the totalizing logos of philosophy (which for 
Lamelle, as a Francophone writer, is of course always la philosophie, 
implying a whole or totality). 6 Even in the constructivist tendencies of a 
2 François Laruelle, Principles of Non-Philosophy, trans. by Nicola Rubczak and 
Anthony Paul Smith (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 19. 
3 Laruelle, En tant qu 'un, p. 26. 
4 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Discourse of the Syncope: Logodaedalus, trans. by Saul Anton 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 18. 
5 It is worth clarifying that in most cases Laruelle uses the term "indifference" in a 
positive sense, describing the mystical indifference of the One to the philosophical 
Dyad (in its manifold mutations), and thus to the world - the basis of the unilateral 
causality upon which his project of"non-philosophy" proper is grounded. My usage 
of this term in a more negative sense is drawn from his description of "the point of 
view of the philosopher, who surveys [survole] the situation, denying its radical 
individual finitude, its proper essence, to better ensure his mastery 
over others, whom he plunges back into the neutral and partially indifferent element 
of the relational" (François Laruelle, A Biography of Ordinary Man: On Authorities 
and Minorities, trans. by Jessie Hock and Alex Dubilet [Cambridge and Malden, MA: 
Polity, 2018], pp. 51-52). 
6 Ray Brassier considers this treatment of philosophy as an auto-positional totality 
(which appears much less self-evident in English, given that "philosophy" is not 
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philosopher such as Gilles the 
concept to communicate truth might be 
truth of philosophy as a whole its ceaseless becoming) 
as coterminous with the capacities of thought still remains stable.7 This is 
what LarueHe labels the of Sufficient 
the fact that philosophy "is not just a set of and 
syntaxes and experiences or operations of decision and position", but is 
"animated and traversed by a faith or belief in itself as in absolute 
by an intentionality or reference to the real which it claims to describe 
and even constitute". 8 
The question is then: is it possible to think style without content? I 
will propose that within the terms of Laruelle' s project this is possible, 
that doing so would be to think as proceeding from the real without 
ever determining or being convertible with the real, and that this is an 
important first step in non-philosophical thinking. If philosophy views 
as a medium for communicating the real (in whatever form it might 
and thus implicitly conceives of all individual as 
encompassed within the presupposed sufficiency of an indifference that 
encompasses all such non-philosophy contrast takes 
as material (relative rather than and autonomous rather than 
an a that gives experience without making any claim to 
the real, even whilst it is determined in the last instance by the latter. This 
is not a celebration of "style over substance", so to speak, but a 
typically preceded by a definite article) to reveal "Laruelle's all too Heideggerian 
preoccupation with uncovering the essence of philosophy", recapitulating the Idealist 
conflation of the philosophical system with the world-whole (Nihil Unbound: 
Enlightenment and Extinction [Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007], p. 133). 
7 See, for instance, the claim that "[t]o think is to create - there is no other creation -
but to create is first of all to engender 'thinking' in thought" (Gilles Deleuze, 
Difference and Repetition, trans. by Paul Patton [London and New York: Continuum, 
1994], p. 185). Deleuze would of course later refine this assertion, arguing that 
philosophy is by its very nature traversed by those exteriorities to which it typically 
pays no heed, suggesting that "[t]he nonphilosophical is perhaps closer to the heart of 
philosophy than philosophy itself' (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is 
Philosophy?, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell [New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994], p. 41). Yet in making this acknowledgement, Deleuze never 
cedes philosophy's overall presumed authority to appropriate these non-philosophical 
exteriorities, nor to establish these disciplinary demarcations within its own linguistic 
tropes. 
8 François Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, trans. by Taylor Adkins 
(Minneapolis, MN: Univocal, 2013), p. 12. 
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without substance, a style that is no longer paired with semantic content, 
but wherein form and function coincide without remainder. 
Clarity and obscurity 
When one mentions the topic of "style" in relation to the work of 
Laruelle, the discussion will almost inevitably move toward the problem 
of Laruelle's own style, which is often regarded as needlessly obtuse and 
cryptic, relying heavily upon a vocabulary largely borrowed directly from 
philosophy (e.g. immanence and transcendence, identity and difference, 
empirical and ideal, transcendental and a priori, etc.), but twisting and 
mutating these terms such that they only superficially retain their 
philosophical meaning. Like deconstruction before it, there is a decided 
attempt across Laruelle's oeuvre to challenge and subvert the identity of 
philosophical concepts, instantiating "a global change of perspective" 
regarding philosophy 's "finalities and functions", inventing new practices 
of writing on the basis of the philosophical materials whose sufficiency it 
suspends.9 As Anthony Paul Smith puts it, Laruelle's "intentionally 
difficult syntax aims not at confusion but at a reorganization of thought 
itself', being concerned not so much with "bringing down philosophy 
from the inside", but instead accepting "a certain homelessness, a 
perpetual status as a foreigner within the intellectual field".10 Non-
philosophy makes usage of philosophical concepts without ever being 
beholden to their traditional signification. 
One of Laruelle's many notable stylistic quirks is his self-
mythologizing periodization of his project into several discrete stages 
(Philosophy I, Philosophy II, Philosophy III, and so on . . . ), each 
ostensibly representing a further step in the development of his non-
philosophical thought. 11 In the introduction to one of the earliest books of 
9 Ibid., p. 126. 
10 Anthony Paul Smith, Laruelle: A Stranger Thought (Cambridge and Malden, MA: 
Polity, 20 16), pp. 2, 50. As Brassier similarly remarks, "[t]he originality of a 
philosopher is usually gauged in terms of what he thinks. By way of contrast, 
Laruelle's singular contribution only becomes appreciable when it is understood that 
he proposes to transform how philosophers think" (Nihil Unbound, p. 148). 
11 In more recent years, following his alignment of non-philosophy with the concepts 
of quantum physics, Laruelle has described these not as stages but as "waves", 
abandoning the implication of a straightforward temporal succession. See Anthony 
Paul Smith, A Non-Philosophical Theory of Nature: Ecologies of Thought 
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the retroactively-labelled Philosophy I stage, . Textual Machines: 
Deconstruction and the Libido of Writing , Laruelle himself wntes: 
[ 0 ]ne will not find an "objective" analysis on one side and an 
interpretation or theses on the other. Everythmg 1s conducted 
simultaneously for the greatest difficulty of readmg: the 
analysis of procedures and dispositifs, and the permanent, 
militant problematization of deconstruction. 12 
In a later book of this period, The Decline of Writing , Laruelle would 
reflect further upon this question of readability, arguing that there IS "an 
illegibility proper to theoretical construction", and claiming for himself 
"the right to be difficult through excess in analysts and excess. in the 
synthesis of problems" .13 These declarations, although long preceding the 
formalization of non-philosophy tout court (and in particular the 
discovery of the aforementioned Principle. of . Sufficient Philosophy)
nonetheless provides not only an attempt to justify his recondite stylistic
tendencies, but also an important hint to the trajectory of Laruelle's later 
work: most notably, the refusal to separate the theory of non-philosophy 
from its practical enunciation, even if this risks rendenng his prose 
enigmatic. 
In spite of any such justifications,. it is certainly not unreasonable to 
express some level of hesitation regardmg the density and complexity of 
Laruelle's prose - and in particular,. to remark upon the potential
performative contradiction between his pretens10ns to an ordinary 
mode of thought unburdened by philosophical arrogance, and the often 
extraordinary obscurity of his writing. The question of commumcat10n -
and communicability - should not be glibly dismissed in relation to any 
theory, philosophical or otherwise, especially when the latter. makes 
appeal to these egalitarian postures. Simultaneously though, we might ask 
exactly what it is that motivates these concerns regardmg the clarity or 
otherwise of Laruelle's style, beyond the usual accusations of 
obscurantism that still accompany the reception of continental philosophy 
within the English-speaking world. ls there not, in the praise of clarity or 
(Basinostoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 74. 
12 François Laruelle, Machines textuelles. Deconstruction et libido d 'ecriture (Pans: 
Editions du Seuil , 1976), p. 17, my translation. 
13 François Laruelle, Le déclin de l'écriture (Paris: Aubier-Flammanon, 1977), p. 249, 
my translation . 
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the condemnation of opacity ( or indeed vice-versa), a very classically 
hermeneutic presupposition that somewhere within the text, whether 
straightforwardly visible or hidden within its depths, there is a truth 
awaiting revelation? 
To indict a piece of writing for its stylistic impenetrability is to 
presume that it is hiding something behind its textual surface ( even if this 
"something" is nothing more than an absence of meamng --: or, perhaps 
even more scandalously, a banal or commonsensical meamng), treatmg 
this truth as an object that must be uncovered. What else was the 
postmodernist fascination with the play of surfaces - the identification of 
depth as a mere epiphenomenon of the manifest - than the supposed 
discovery of an originary absence ( a groundless ground) undergirding
these surfaces? "The unitary or dominant way of thinkmg , which is to 
say the specifically philosophical mode of thinking, "is that of a 
generalized hermeneutics, a hermeto-logy". 14 In the hermeneutic mode of 
reading, as Alexander Galloway writes, "there is never simply a direct 
relationship to truth, there is always a confrontation with truth", and this 
confrontation will never fail in unearthing something within the text. 15 In 
a specifically philosophical context, we find that the accusation of 
obscurity occurs entirely within the rules and stnctures of philosophical
reason (even when it is mounted by those who would not consider 
themselves philosophers), according to which style is either the conduit 
or impediment to the truth of the real (in whatever particular form it 
might take). Style, and rhetoric more generally, tends to be understood m 
philosophy either as "ornamentation", which must be swept aside m order 
to get directly to the real, or as "persuasion", a tool of inveiglement that is 
only really appropriate for those cruder texts aimed at a mass audience. 
In both cases, it remains peripheral or mediate to the truth that lies 
beneath it, a mere instrument of philosophical discourse, the "teleological 
usage of language in view of the essential real" .17 
14 François Laruelle, "The Truth According to Hermes: Theorems on the Secret and 
Communication", Parrhesia, 9, 18-22 (p. 19). 
15 Alexander R. Galloway, "Love of the Middle", in Excommunication: Three
Inquiries in Media and Mediation, by Alexander R. Galloway, Eugene Thacker, and 
McKenzie Wark (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2014), pp. 25-76 (p. 
37). . 
l6 François Laruelle, Dictionary of Non-Philosophy, trans. by Taylor Adkms 
(Minneapolis, MN: Univocal, 2012), p. 103. 
17 Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, p. 8. 
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Accusations of obscurity constitute a crucial element of the auto-
warfare that Laruelle views as essential to the circularity of philosophical 
decision: 
[p ]hilosophy's traditional practices, the history of philosophy, 
textual and philological labor, but also the invention of new 
philosophical decisions (language games, deconstruction and 
schizoanalysis) remain . . . enclosed in themselves, wrapped 
and encysted around the fundamental postulate that defines 
Greco-occidental thought and its most internal limitation. 18 
Put simply, whilst philosophers may attack the stylistic predilections of 
other philosophers, what remains unchallenged is the presumption that 
philosophy's telos is a becoming-sufficient to the real that it attempts to 
seize as object. Even moments that would seem to directly challenge the 
authority of philosophical reason (e.g. Nietzsche's transvaluation of truth 
as mere metaphor; Heidegger's proclamation of the death of philosophy 
at the hands of cybernetic instrumentalism; Deleuze's denunciation of the 
dogmatic image of thought; Derrida's deconstruction of the metaphysics 
of presence, etc.), decentring or displacing the philosophical paradigm, 
nevertheless still presuppose the authority of the logos. 
These debates occur for Laruelle within terms of reference that are 
established in advance (and remain invariant across philosophy's 
innumerable variations), and one might argue that they ultimately 
originate (at least in an overt form) in the ancient opposition between 
Parmenides' extolment of the need for a well-rounded exposition of the 
One divorced from all empirical diversion, and Heraclitus' equivalent 
appeal to a discourse of the logos that is coterminous with (rather than 
merely clouded by) its enigmatic and equivocal presentation. Just as the 
disparity between these two philosophers' conceptions of the real itself 
(the former as a unity purged of its contraries, the latter as a unity-of-
contraries) does not compromise the overall stability of the decisional 
structure (the One and the Dyad) in which they are enacted, likewise, 
both of these stylistic extremes are happily contained within the polarities 
of philosophical disputation. As Nietzsche once put it, "multiplicity, 
which is a deception of the sense according to Parmenides, is for 
18 Ibid., p. 102. 
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Heraclitus the cloth, the form of appearance, of the One, in no way a 
deception: otherwise, the One does not appear at all". 19 
In both cases, the One is presumed to be given as an object 
communicable through the philosophical idiom and syntax. Yet from the 
non-philosophical perspective, this presupposition on the contrary 
exemplifies the forgetting of the One (qua One) by philosophy, its 
confusion of the One with Being (or the Other): 
[t]he forgetting of the One is stronger and more extensive than 
the forgetting of Being: it is consummated not only by the 
"metaphysics of presence", but by all philosophy as thought 
founded principally upon transcendence (even when 
"absolute", even when deconstructive of the authority of the 
logos). The future of thought is in the assumption of the One 
"itself' or qua One rather than Being qua Being.20 
Laruelle's provocation is accordingly to propose a modality of thought, 
theoretical rather than philosophical, that does not attempt to seize the 
One (i.e. the real) as object, but instead attempts to think according to the 
One, in the latter's "de jure opacity, its unreflexivity".21 In this manner, 
he claims, the One is "restored to its real or ante-dyadic essence", no 
longer treated as reciprocal, reversible, or even identical with 
philosophical categories and concepts.22 The question to be explored, 
then, is the extent to which we might plausibly speak of a usage of 
philosophical style that is not strictly philosophical; to treat style as an 
effect of the real, rather than a means of transmitting some semblance of 
the real. 
The (impossible) object of philosophical desire 
In spite of constant disputes between individual philosophers, Laruelle 
perceives philosophy as effectively suspended in a state of perpetual 
detente, for each philosopher is in the end resigned to the structural 
invariance of philosophical decision. These philosophers "trace a 
19 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, ed. and trans. by Greg 
Whitlock (Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2001), p. 63. 
20 Laruelle, En tant qu 'un, p. 121. 
21 Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, p. 76. 
22 Ibid., p. 16. 
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continuous circular line in their heads, they only want compromise, unity-
despite-everything as long as it is based on difference", affirming the 
plurality or heterogenesis of philosophy as a central component in its 
overall c'oherence.23 The philosophical logos - that is to say, the linguistic 
framework, both idiomatic and syntactic, and irreducible to any particular 
natural language, through which philosophical concepts are disseminated 
- functions as a "universal interface", ensuring the univocity of these 
concepts in spite of (or perhaps by virtue of. .. ) their difference.24 One of 
the (tacit) founding principles of philosophy, writes Galloway, is the 
assumption that the real is "something that can be grasped and 
communicated beyond itself into a receiving mind, the mind of the 
investigating philosopher", and the logos is precisely the medium, in the 
most literal sense, on which this is grounded.25 
This is an ideal of philosophy as a characteristica universalis, an 
aspiration "to be a universal language for regional forms of knowledge", 
mediating all extra-philosophical discourses and practices under the aegis 
of the logos, speaking in one and the same voice regarding all of its 
concepts.26 An ideal articulated in plainly universalist, cosmopolitical 
terms by Alain Badiou, who declares that 
the principle that philosophy cannot renounce is that of its 
universal transmissibility, whatever its connection to such or 
such a language. Philosophy cannot renounce that its address 
is directed to everyone, in principle if not in fact, and that it 
does not exclude from this address linguistic, national, 
religious or racial communities. Philosophy privileges no 
language, not even the one it is written in. Philosophy is not 
enclosed within the pure formal ideal of scientific language. 
23 Laruelle, A Biography of Ordinary Man, p. 41, translation altered. I take the term 
heterogenesis from Deleuze who, in a letter to Jean-Clet Martin, argues that 'the 
system must not only be in perpetual heterogeneity, it must also be a heterogenesis' 
(Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995, ed. by David Lapoujade, 
trans. by Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina [Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2007], p. 
361). 
24 François Laruelle, The Non-Philosophy Project, ed. by Gabriel Alkon and Boris 
Gunjevic (New York: Telos Press, 2012), 102. 
25 Alexander R. Galloway, Laruelle: Against the Digital (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014), p. 10. 
26 Laruelle, The Non-Philosophy Project, p. 103. 
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Its element is language, but, within that natural element, it 
institutes a universal address.27 
Badiou's claim would seem to be positioned in direct opposition to the 
postmodernist obituary for metalanguage, and the resultant valorization 
of incommensurable language-games. In practice though, it is actually an 
affirmation and reinforcement of this pluralization as the very essence of 
philosophical thought, revealing the metastable play of identity and 
difference in the philosophical logos. Philosophy is nothing other than a 
series of differences, of seemingly incompatible language games, that are 
nonetheless ultimately unified under the rules of a structural invariant. 
"We are decidedly spinning in place, that is, still and always within 
philosophy" .28 
In this context, the element of style stands for an organon through 
which the philosophy-form "expresses the self-repetition and inertia of its 
auto-reproduction", enabling the re-utterance of its principles in diverse 
phraseologies or modes of expression.29 "All philosophical thought seeks 
a 'form of order' [ ... ] which is for it the ultimate rationality of the real, 
one that it in part helps to determine", enabling the conflation of the real 
with various ideal concepts that philosophy gives to itself, and style 
provides one of the means by which these forms of order are established, 
articulating the appropriate means by which the real might be presented 
to thought - given that the logos posits itself as the exclusive medium 
through which this (re)presentation is effectuated.30 Put simply, style 
provides the capacity for philosophies to be differentiated from another, 
defining again and again the appropriate parlance for grasping the real, 
whilst at the same time ensuring the impossibility of ever actually 
achieving this goal, inasmuch as the very notion of style, within a 
27 Alain Badiou, Infinite Thought: Truth and the Return to Philosophy, ed. and trans. 
by Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens (London and New York: Continuum, 2003), p. 
51. 
28 François Laruelle, Philosophies of Difference: A Critical Introduction to Non-
Philosophy, trans. by Rocco Gangle (London and New York: Continuum, 2010), p. 
11. The appendant phrase "to Non-Philosophy" in the title of this book is unique to 
the English translation - and indeed, although within the text itself Laruelle does 
speak occasionally of a "non-philosophical" critique of philosophy, it is only with his 
next book (Philosophy and Non-Philosophy) that the enterprise of a non-philosophy 
proper (la non-philosophie) first manifestly arises. 
29 Laruelle, Dictionary of Non-Philosophy, p. 119. 
30 Laruelle, A Biography of Ordinary Man, p. 51. 
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philosophical context, demands the convertibility of "the real and 
language", such that the former always remains contingent upon the 
latter, even though it is supposed to precede and condition it. 31 This is a 
mixed or unitary form of style, an endlessly circular and tautological co-
determination of these two terms. 
Exemplary of this is Jacques Derrida's assertion that style in phi-
losophy offers "a means of protection against the terrifying, blinding, 
mortal threat ( of that) which presents itself', safeguarding "the presence, 
the content, the thing itself, meaning, truth".32 With this conception of 
style as a necessary act of dissimulation (which he equates with the mas-
culine order of representation) - not a revelation of presence, but an act of 
defence against the différance inherent in representation that simultane-
ously and unwittingly reinscribes this differance in the unbreachable gap 
between presence and its presentation - Derrida confronts the authority of 
traditional Western metaphysics, bringing into question its capacity to 
present to thought the real that it purports to master. And yet, at the very 
same time, does not this appeal to "a non-identity, a non-figure, a simula-
crum" (the ineradicably feminine element of style) simply repeat the 
standard philosophical procedure of transcendence, whereby the pre-
given scission of a naïve empirical datum (viz. representation as an un-
problematic presentation) and an ideal categorial factum (the differance 
that founds both the possibility and impossibility of this presentation) are 
sutured through a movement from the former to the latter (whilst still 
maintaining a reciprocal determination between them)?33 The discovery 
31 Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, p. 8. 
32 Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche 's Styles, trans. by Barbara Harlow (Chicago, IL: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 39. Derrida's argument here is at least 
partly dependent on the phonic similitude between style and stylus, the suspiciously 
phallic instrument of inscription. 
33 Ibid., p. 49. Kelly Oliver illustrates this well when she contends that Derrida "uses 
becoming female to fortify philosophy against the suicide that it finally commits 
through its long history of murdering its other which has been represented by the 
feminine ... he forecloses any possibility of recognizing any other in the feminine 
because the masculine has become the feminine" (Womanizing Nietzsche: 
Philosophy's Relation to the "Feminine" [London and New York: Routledge, 1995], 
p. 49). Likewise, Sara Ahmed argues that, as with Deleuze and Guattari's concept of 
"becoming-woman", Derrida's account posits the figure of "woman" as "a phantasy 
of the over-coming of philosophical and masculine identity, but an over-comingwhich 
is more a coming-over, in that identity comes to be figured in different terms over the 
body of the woman", denying this figure the embodied subjectivity of actually 
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of this simulacrum - the secret that the text might indeed hold no secret, 
"that it might only be pretending to be simulating some hidden truth with-
in its folds" - which is intended to subvert the notion of a truth that might 
be uncovered within the text, is in effect only the dislocation of this truth 
onto the figure of the simulacral: the identity of the truth of the text is 
precisely its non-identity, the trace through which its presence 1s de-
ferred.34 
The "gentle war of suspicion" waged by deconstruction, Laruelle 
therefore argues, still remains within the circle of philocentrism, seekmg 
out the real as a unitary object synthesizing difference and identity under 
the guise of an auto-differentiating/-deferring differance.35 The 
foreclosure of the transcendental signified (and hence with it the fantasy 
of attaining the identity of the real) actually further reinforces the auto-
productive character of the philosophical logos, both justifying and 
perpetuating "these games in which it reproduces itself m an ultimately 
limited way" by forsaking the possibility of an end-pomt to this 
reproduction, and thus finally identifying the real precisely with the ever-
distending concept of difference qua differance and its various mutations 
(e.g. the trace, supplement, pharmakon, simulacrun:, arche-writing,
iterability, etc.) through which the truth of any particular identity 1s 
rendered suspect. 36 "It is a matter of its inevitable constitution m an 
invariant re-affirming and re-producing of itself unlimitedly in, by and 
through its variations" .37 In this respect, deconstruction marks yet another 
instance of the continuous philosophical attestations to a supenor access 
existing women (Differences That Matter: Feminist Theory and Postmodernism 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], pp. 88-89). 
34 Ibid., p. 133. 
35 Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, p. 27. 
36 Ibid., p. 102. . 
37 Laruelle, Philosophies of Difference, p. 121. Such concerns regarding 
deconstruction first arise in the Philosophy I penod, when Laruelle observes that [1]t 
is difficult to practice a generalized suspicion without falling into general formulas of 
suspicion", bringing about "the uniform affirmation of differential heterogeneity" 
(Machines textuelles, p. 27). As Arnaud Villani writes, this latter book "1s resolutely
opposed to representation, opposed to structuralism, but also opposed to the mfm1te 
text (commentary upon commentary), the sort of lay Talmudic text with its play of 
mirrors (mimesis without priority given to the imitated)" ("Poststructurahst 
Alternatives to Deconstruction", in The Textual Sublime: Deconstruction and Its 
Differences, ed. by Hugh J. Silverman and Gary E. Aylesworth [Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1990], pp. 223-230 [p. 224]). 
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to the real - "return to the real! return to the things themselves! at last 
thinking the forgotten real! and so forth" - that in practice do little other 
than entrench the notion that philosophy as a whole is capable of 
exhausting the real in its totality (indeed, that the two are coterminous).38 
The real remains the impossible object of philosophical desire, 
whose unattainability does not subdue the presumed authority of the 
philosophical logos, but simply provides the impetus for further 
production or heterogenesis. This is why philosophical critiques of style, 
even those outside of the deconstructive matrix, remain toothless: stylistic 
or linguistic analysis of individual philosophies is a "transcendentally 
recursive" venture, that does not so much explain these philosophies as 
simply reproduce the philosophical structure within a new form. 39 To 
critique a philosopher's style is still a thoroughly philosophical enterprise, 
adjudicating between philosophies on the basis of certain rhetorico-
linguistic criteria in order to determine their relative efficacy in regard to 
the truth that they seek, and results in the production of further 
philosophy (insofar as the very pretence that one might have the capacity 
to make such judgements itself presupposes an authority vis-à-vis the 
real). 
What Laruelle claims to offer, by contrast, is a non-philosophical 
practice of style and rhetoric that is "no longer measured by an efficacy 
(persuasion) or an inefficacy (the obscuring of relations of transparency 
to the real)", bypassing the intra-philosophical auto-warfare that would 
counterpose one style against another, and instead treating style as an 
enrichment of philosophical material detached from any question of its 
adequation to the real.40 Through this unilateralization of style, whereby 
38 
François Laruelle, Theory of Identities, trans. by Alyosha Edlebi (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2016), p. 101. We might note also here the 
aforementioned heterogenetic becoming-of-philosophy championed by Deleuze, 
whereby "[a] philosophy's power is measured by the concepts it creates, or whose 
meaning it alters, concepts that impose a new set of divisions on things and actions"
(Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. by Martin Joughin 
[New York: Zone Books, 1990], p. 321). Although this certainly dispenses with the 
need to compare concepts in terms of their adequation to the real, it does so by 
instituting new benchmarks for comparison: as he would later write, "[p]hilosophy 
does not consist in knowledge and is not inspired by truth", but instead, "it is 
categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that decide its success or 
failure" (Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 82, translation altered). 39 Laruelle, The Non-Philosophy Project, p. 96. 
40 Laruelle, Dictionary of Non-Philosophy, p. 105. 
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the latter does not provide the means for thinking the real qua object, but 
instead is thought as arising from and in accordance with the real, 
"[ e ]very approach will be able to be recognized as individuated", for no 
style will be judged as being properly or improperly philosophical in 
some way.41 Each style is treated as wholly individual, shorn of all 
indifference that would allow philosophers to make such comparisons.42 
This of course does not mean that we must dispense with 
philosophical language; on the contrary, non-philosophy is not intended 
to be anti-philosophical, as "it contains the philosophical genre as a 
particular case or a limited thought, it is what becomes philosophical as a 
genre when it is seized and transformed" via a thought that proceeds from 
(rather than toward) the real: 
in lieu of producing apparently non-philosophical effects 
(literary, psychoanalytic, etc.) with procedures that remain 
essentially philosophical (as is the case with deconstructions, 
for example), we propose to use really non-philosophical 
procedures to produce effects that have an ultimate likeness, a 
final "family resemblance" with philosophy.43 
Non-philosophy makes usage of philosophical materials (in this case, the 
style that constitutes the identity of their presentation), but does so in a 
manner intended to suspend the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy, 
making no claim to the real whatsoever, but conceiving of all such 
41 Ibid. 
42 It is for this reason that we cannot equate such a treatment of style as individual 
with the Deleuzian notion of the conceptual personae, for the latter, which constitutes 
"the becoming or the subject of a philosophy", is simply one part of a larger 
movement of becoming-philosophy that envelops it, remaining wholly relational 
(Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 64). Deleuze in fact represents at one 
and the same time those two tendencies that Laruelle identifies in contemporary 
continental philosophy: the oscillation between an "identification with a seminal 
author of past metaphysics" on the one hand, and a "postmodern bricolage with the 
debris of this same past metaphysics" on the other (Laruelle, En tant qu 'un, p. 183). 
Deleuze makes unusually overt his dependence upon the styles, as well as the 
concepts, of prior philosophers, but also his practice of using these as the basis for 
new assemblages and becomings. His appeal to the novelty of the philosophical 
concept is founded upon an account of philosophical diachrony as a font of materials 
for creative reconfiguration in the name of a continued becoming-philosophy. 
43 Laruelle, En tant qu 'un, p. 188. 
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materials as identical with the real in the last instance. The 
unilateralization of style attempts to avoid inscribing the constitutive 
terms of any individual philosophy within a reversible duality or unity-of-
contraries, but instead in "an originary dyad that is not obtained by 
scission and is thus not susceptible to an identification with the real" -
that is, an irreversible order of determination that proceeds unilaterally 
from the real. 44 
Nietzschean origins in non-philosophy 
We can see an obvious antecedent for this unilateralization of style in the 
work of Friedrich Nietzsche who, in one of his more lurid moments (a 
stylistic trait not atypical, of course, of his later works), declares: 
To communicate a state, an inner tension of pathos, with signs, 
including the tempo of these signs - that is the meaning of 
every style; and considering that I have an extraordinary 
number of inner states, I also have a lot of stylistic 
possibilities [ ... ] 
Good style in itself - this is pure stupidity, just "idealism", 
somewhat like "Beauty in itself', "the Good in itself', the 
"thing in itself' ... Always supposing that there are ears - that 
there are people capable and worthy of a similar pathos, that 
there are people you can communicate with.45 
Nietzsche refuses to endorse any sensus communis through which styles 
are given a general equivalence (again, an indifference) that would enable 
their universal communication and by which the efficacy of such styles in 
facilitating said communication might be judged. 
The Nietzschean understanding of style therefore marks an 
important precedent for Laruelle' s theory of unilateralization: after all, 
Nietzsche demands that style be regarded not as an index of the real (such 
that we could judge it in terms of degrees of adequation), but as a singular 
production irrevocably sutured to the will of the individual.46 It is not 
44 Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, p. 54. 
45 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other 
Writings, ed. by Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. by Judith Norman 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 104. 
46 As Kofman puts it, Nietzsche believes it tyrannical for "any philosopher to raise his 
I 
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surprising that Laruelle himself makes such a connection, noting that 
"Nietzsche intensifies fiction by freeing it from the residual identity of 
the imagination as faculty, namely by freeing synthesis from the 
constraint of ready-made unity". 47 In other words, Nietzsche views the 
creative (i.e. fictive) capacities of philosophy as unrestrained by any 
necessary transcendental unity or synthesis that would ensure the ultimate 
concordance of such fictions. In fact, in The Minority Principle (the first 
book of Laruelle's Philosophy II period, and the beginnings of what 
would come to be known as "non-philosophy"), Laruelle submits that it is 
from Nietzsche that "we learn that the transcendental is method and 
nothing but method", for what we find in the latter is the constitution of a 
universal genetic a priori - specifically, "Difference as umversal [ ... ] the 
ongoing synthesis of Becoming and Being, the Real and the Ideal", by 
which all phenomena are conditioned and under which they are 
subsumed, simultaneously.48 But whilst this universal horizon of Being as 
the eternal repetition of Difference "forms the highest. point. of passage, 
the highest 'pass' of the classical method, its supreme intensification , it
is also "its point of decline": Laruelle comes to view Nietzsche s 
conception of the transcendental as still beholden to the notion of a 
transcendental field that, although not inscribed in self-consciousness or
self-presence like its classical and phenomenological predecessors, is still
figured as a "field of presence" which is wholly present to itself in its
becoming or differentiation, and therefore "always transcendent m spite 
of its transcendental pretension [ ... ] relatively, and not absolutely 
transcendental" .49 
Put simply, by the Philosophy II stage Laruelle has come to view 
Nietzsche as just another philosopher, who pushes the transcendental 
[sic] spontaneous evaluation to the status of an absolute value and his style to that of a 
philosophical style 'in itself"', for "it is as vain to seek to impose a canomcal model 
on writing as it is tile to seek to legislate universally in morality: each must do only 
what he can". In reconstructing the thought of a particular philosopher then, we must 
not trace her or his life (as much as it is coterminous with their thought) "with the aid 
of abstract general concepts", transmuting them into a mere spectre of their former 
selves, but must instead "use expressive and vivid metaphors to resurrect a personality 
in its most typical attributes". (Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor, trans. by 
Duncan Large [London: The Athlone Press, 1993], pp. 3, 22). 
47 Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, p. 228 
48 François Laruelle, Le principe de minorite (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1981), p. 18, 
my translation. 
49 Ibid., p. 18. 
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method to the limits of its plasticity and creativity, but who cannot 
ultimately overcome the transcendence that arises from the construction 
of an ideal field of presence, the being of which is constituted in its 
becoming or difference (a presence without being present). 50 In the books 
that precede this stage, however, Laruelle is far more sympathetic to the 
Nietzschean problematic, and in fact gives Nietzsche a privileged 
position. In Textual Machines, wherein Laruelle identifies a machinic and 
transcendental functionality - a libido-of-writing - to be grafted onto the 
method of deconstruction, hoping to produce new immanent effects from 
within said method's procedures, he observes that 
the most powerful form of the "deconstruction" machine, that 
which attains a transcendental generality absolutely 
unconditioned in relation to the materials of the philosophical 
tradition, has provisionally received in history the split name 
of"Eternal Return" and "Will to Power".51 
Accordingly, Laruelle explicitly sets out to displace the problematics of 
deconstruction onto new positions - specifically, "[t]hose which are 
implicated, in a latent rather than manifest state, in 'Nietzsche-thought', 
or in the esoteric problematic of the Eternal Return and the Will to 
Power", which refer respectively to a generalized repetition and intensive 
50 Indeed, Laruelle would come to argue that "[t]he Nietzschean experience of 
Difference ... is in effect inseparable from a quasi-' auto-position', of idealist and 
classically metaphysical spirit, of Difference's syntax and of the moment that, at its 
interior, represents already the insertion of the real: the diversity of this 'distance' 
(forces, perspectives, etc.)" (Philosophies of Difference, p. 41). The Nietzschean (and 
Deleuzian) conception of difference is dependent upon the ultimate coincidence of 
syntax and experience (inasmuch as the latter is understood as the ceaseless 
rearticulation of the former). 
51 Laruelle, Machines textuelles, p. 42. The influence of Anti-Oedipus is easily 
recognizable in these early works - in particular, the former's conceptualization of 
schizoanalysis as a transcendental and materialist mode of analysis, "immanent to the 
field of the unconscious" and thus to its own criteria; "an unconscious that is material 
rather than ideological; schizophrenic rather than Oedipal; nonfigurative rather than 
imaginary; real rather than symbolic; machinic rather than structural", and ultimately 
"productive rather than expressive", refusing to re-establish a transcendent use of 
language that would reduce desire to a mere question of signification, enervating it of 
its productive (i.e. machinic) charge. (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and 
Helen R. Lane [London and New York: Continuum, 1983], p.120). 
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libido that together form this dispositif by which deconstruction as a 
generalized textuality indifferant to all empirical representation and
signification is affirmed. 52 Eternal Return of the Other 1s posited as the 
most powerful system of repetition and deconstruction", a process of 
production "which turns around a non-specific, non-individual, non-
signifying differance" .53 . 
Laruelle is at this stage still committed to the deconstruct1ve "play 
of language", which "excludes the categories or paired oppositions" that 
are usually assigned to the control of language, and thereby "disrupts the 
distribution of the author, the signature, the corpus, and all the 
appropriative procedures of a text", dismissing them as logocentric and 
ideological procedures. At the same time though, whilst Laruelle 1s 
undoubtedly wedded here to the authority (i.e. sufficiency) of 
deconstruction reconfigured as a transcendental method, we must take 
seriously his rejection of "both positive mastery and hermeneutic 
reverence", when he argues that 
the composition of "methods" and ''styles" does not take the 
form of a process of accumulation, but that of a kind of de-
multiplication of hermeneutic totalizations and small 
structural differences, together forming a complex instrument 
for inclusive and multi-stage operations, for the effects of 
multiplicity. 54 
Laruelle's intention is not to proffer a more "correct" reading of either 
Nietzsche or Derrida, but to extract new functionalities and new effects 
from these given materials. The status of deconstruction here as "a 
machinic process that is transformed with its materials and effects", its 
capacity to "be singularized in the protocols of reading to be defined for 
each text" forecloses any such possibility of a readmg judged m terms of 
adequation, for this would be to establish in advance transcendent criteria 
by which such reading must proceed.55 Indeed, the disruptive and 
dislocative effects of differance cannot be said to "take place on a fixed 
ground, constituted by all the great authors of philosophy", but must 
52 lbid., p. 9. 
53 Ibid., p. 25. 
54 lbid., p. 32. 
55 Ibid., pp. 62-63. 
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remain immanent interventions that transform these materials in order to 
produce new effects.56 
The machinic syntax of Nietzsche-thought 
"Authors, styles, methods are not absolutely equivalent", writes Laruelle, 
in an important foreshadowing of his later work, "but none of them 
remain or subsist as benchmarks" .57 Here we see the germinal origins of 
the non-philosophical unilateralization of style - a thinking of style that 
makes no judgement regarding its adequacy, but only seeks to produce 
material effects albeit still predicated upon a presumed superiority of 
deconstruction (which is in itself, of course, just another style and method 
of philosophy). The notion of an immanent process of reading that is 
indifferant to any signification or telos, of a condition that is no broader 
than that which it conditions, signals the tentative beginnings of the 
transformative usage of inert philosophical materials that would come to 
characterize non-philosophy proper. In Laruelle's own words, he was 
"born into philosophy at the moment that a new scene was constituted, 
post-strncturalist and post-Marxist: that of Difference", and at this time 
Nietzsche seemed to provide the tools for surveying and rethinking 
contemporary philosophy, "trying hard to accentuate, sharpen, 
overdetermine, to the point of saturation . . . the various modes of 
Difference in a 'generalized syntax"'. 58 It is this "Nietzsche-thought", 
extracted from Nietzsche's philosophy with little regard for any kind of 
hermeneutic fidelity to Nietzsche's texts, that provides both the 
foundation and the ur-example of such usage. 
Nandita Biswas Mellamphy puts it well when she writes that 
Laruelle "takes Nietzsche to be a theoretical object with material effects, 
rather than as a historical subject or interpreter expressing his thoughts", 
and as such, "what he means by Nietzsche's 'thinking' does not refer 
primarily to what Nietzsche said or wrote - or neglected to say or write -
56 Ibid., pp. 43-44. 
57 Ibid., p. 44. 
58 Laruelle, En tant qu 'un, p. 227. On the explicit thematization of style amongst the 
philosophers of difference, see Isabelle Ginoux, "Effets de stvle en histoire de la 
philosophie: Ironie, humour et mascarade chez Deleuze lecteur de Nietzsche", in Les 
styles de Deleuze: Esthétique et philosophie, ed. by Adnen Jdey (Brussels: Les 
Impressions nouvelles, 2011), pp. 73-104. 
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but rather to the way in which Nietzsche's thinking functions".59 The 
chief example of this occurs in Laruelle's follow-up to Textual Machines, 
the much more politically-oriented Nietzsche contra Heidegger: Theses 
for a Nietzschean Politics, in which he identifies a Nietzschean rupture in 
thought, comprising two entirely new, complementary d1sc1plmes 
("Political Materialism" and "Machinic Materialism"), whilst also 
directly acknowledging that neither of these disciplines "are formulated 
or presented in this way in the manifest text of Nietzsche".60 "On 
condition that the concept of latency is taken in the sense of resistance 
rather than absence or lack", Laruelle goes on to write, "we will say that 
these disciplines, their objects, and their categories constitute the 'latent' 
content of Nietzsche-thought".61 We immediately see, therefore, that 
these disciplines are not concealed or buried within the Nietzschean 
corpus; they are, instead, those features of Nietzsche-thought that would 
allow it to resist all claims to textual mastery made upon it.62 
In this book, Laruelle seeks to determine a thought that is 
specifically Nietzschean, in a purely philosophical and political sense, 
without recourse to any "historical, hermeneutic, or textual projects", 
because to take the approach of the historian, philologist, rhetorician, or 
psychoanalyst would be "to measure [Nietzsche] against objects and
goals that are not his".63 Such a determination thus mev1tably comc1des 
with "the destruction of Nietzsche as an individual, writer, and thinker" -
it must abandon all appeals to an authenticity grounded in the life of 
59Nandita Biswas Mellamphy, "Nietzsche's Political Materialism: Diagram for a 
Nietzschean Politics", in Nietzsche as Political Philosopher, ed. by Manuell Knoll 
and Barry Stocker (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), pp. 77-89 (p. 78). 
andFrançois Laruelle, Nietzsche contre Heidegger: Thèses pour une politique 
nietzscheenne (Paris: Payot, 1977), p. 32, my translation. 
61 Ibid. 
62 There is a persistent theme in this book of Nietzsche-thought as effecting a 
resistance against all forms of mastery: e.g. "[s]omething in 'Nietzsche' resists the 
codes of the historian, the formal means of the rhetorician, the vaticinations of the 
fascist, the cumbersome apparatus of the classical revolutionary" (Nietzsche contre 
Heidegger, p. 15). By the Philosophy II period, "resistance" would conversely come 
to chiefly signify for Laruelle the operations of transcendence by which philosophy 
occludes the One, "the very way in which [philosophy] presents itself from the start, 
presenting itself only in the form of protestation, refusal, objections, etc., a resistance 
to the One which is exactly the same thing as its auto-sufficiency" (Philosophy and 
Non-Philosophy, p. 57). 
63 Laruelle, Nietzsche contre Heidegger, p. 67. 
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Nietzsche himself or in the significations of his text, turning instead 
toward the functionality of the Nietzschean syntax - and in turn seeks "to 
destroy any external or transcendent usage of the text of Nietzsche" that 
would wed his thought to extrinsic criteria of interpretation or 
judgement.64 In this manner, then, the identification of this Nietzsche-
thought, which is "a question of immanent syntax and of fluctuant 
[fluante] material proper to this syntax", is inseparable from its 
effectuation: the extraction of those Nietzschean functions that resist all 
transcendence.65 Anticipating, in a more restricted fashion, his later 
definition of transcendence (in the Philosophy II period and thenceforth) 
as the basic operation by which philosophy claims a certain authority 
over the individual and over the real, in Nietzsche contra Heidegger a 
transcendent syntax is a code that is "destined to ensure the appropriation 
and domination of fluctuant machinic statements and propositions", 
attenuating the propulsive, creative drive of this specifically Nietzschean 
mode of thought. 66 
Laruelle's aim here is to "distinguish between the positivity of the 
statement and the positivism that its abstract practice risks inducing": 
whereas the former "is in a certain manner manifest, given, transparent, 
and does not respond to any unconscious or hidden representation", and 
thus cannot be reduced to the position of a signifier, and the abstraction 
that "gives rise to positivism as soon as the statement ... is cut from its 
immanent premises, from its material determination in the last 
instance".67 A distinction is made between two quite different usages of 
language, one of which encodes statements and propositions, dominating 
and appropriating them toward instrumental ends (thereby bestowing 
meaning upon them), whilst the other simply functions (producing 
material effects without the need for any such signification). It is the 
latter, this machinic syntax, that "ensures the fluctuance [fluance] and 
metamorphosis of the Nietzschean propositions, their permanent 
transformation and the critical destruction of their discursive, semantic, or 
significative interiority". 68 Put simply, the essence of Nietzsche-thought 
lies precisely in its irreducibility to any particular determinate concept, its 
64 Ibid., pp. 68, 70. 
65 Ibid., p. 12. 
66 Ibid., p. 73. 
67 Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
68 Ibid., p. 73. 
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indomitable resistance to any straightforward "reading" or interpretation 
of his corpus.69 
Our task, resultantly, is "not to repeat what Nietzsche said and what 
he did not say, or to think only what he did and did not think, but to 
mount a dispositif both theoretical and practical that fulfils the function of 
thinking in a Nietzschean mode, which produces substances and even 
more 'Nietzschean' articulations".70 This is a libidinal liberation of 
Nietzsche-thought from its transcendent interpretations: "to affirm the 
sovereignty of desire against its existential and existentiell, religious, 
hermeneutic, or signifying perversions, this is a task of the analyst ( or 
indeed of the schizoanalyst)" .71 Although he would soon come to 
69 Throughout the Philosophy I period, Laruelle clearly views it as possible for 
philosophy to prevent its own stagnation, and this need to articulate a labile 
philosophy unencumbered by the shackles of systematicity in large part motivates his 
reconfigurations of contemporary philosophy: e.g. "[i]t is evident from the precipitous 
reduction of deconstruction to a body of homogeneous techniques of textual 
heterogeneity, that we have failed to preserve the analysis, the reading and rewriting 
of Derridean practices. Do we assign to them another purpose? Do we take the risk of 
ordering them into a thesis, when they are without purpose and do not have the form 
of any thesis?" (Machines textuelles, p. 27). 
70 Laruelle, Nietzsche contre Heidegger, p. 75. 
71 Ibid., p. 220. This characterization of interpretation as a repressive perversion of 
desire is comparable to Deleuze and Guattari's critique of the psychoanalytic 
paralogism which effects "the conversion of the unconscious to Oedipus, form and 
content", a metaphysical operation which extracts from the connective syntheses (the 
production of production) a transcendent object posited as lack (Anti-Oedipus, p. 83). 
The task of schizoanalysis, a becoming-immanent of analysis, is thus to establish a 
practice founded upon the immanence of the transcendental unconscious to its own 
criteria, rather than extracting from it a despotic signification. Such themes run 
throughout the Philosophy I period. In Textual Machines, which is very much focused 
on ''the problem of the power or desire of the subject of writing", conceiving of 
deconstruction as driven by a "libidinal production and reproduction", Laruelle argues 
that we must avoid conceptualizing writing as "a pure, self-sufficient, a priori 
element" which is then fixed or reified in particular significative forms, for this would 
reconstitute writing as "a transcendent and abstract principle, too 'broad' for the given 
texts" - instead, we must understand ''the philosophical and scientific work of 
domination of the values of the mark, of their selection, their placing into systems and 
hierarchies" as coming '"from' the pharmakon (writing) as from a genetic differantial 
element, a non-representational site, the potency [puissance] of machinic genesis 
traversed by technical and linguistic impotence [ ... ] a transcendental and immanent 
production of textual différance" (Machines textuelles, pp. 12, 66). Likewise, in 
Beyond the Power Principle, the final book of this period, which is premised upon an 
understanding of power as "a fluctuant matter, continuous, unlimited[ ... ] infinitely 
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renounce this framework of machinic desire inscribed within a 
transcendental field of immanence, we can nevertheless find some 
important hints here as to what would eventually become the non-
philosophical account of language (and with it, a tacit account of style 
also): making usage of a philosophy as material, rather than subscribing 
to their particular conceptual apparatus; extracting a singular essence (or 
haecceity, perhaps ... ) from said philosophy, rather than situating it 
hierarchically in relation to other philosophies; attempting to think in 
divisible", Laruelle argues that political philosophy has always "confused the political 
meaning of power with conceptual significations, imaginary representations, or real 
empirical relations of power", and has consequently "made of meaning in general an 
object, a theme, a form, a signification, a signifier- but never a 'machine', i.e. a 
fractional dispositif capable of simultaneously producing power and its productive 
essence, and the relation between the two" - in short, this has resulted in a confusion 
of "the essence of power with transcendent or dominant fonns" (Fran9ois Laruelle, 
Au-delà du principe de pouvoir [Paris: Payot, 1978], pp. 4, 15, my translation). In all 
of these cases, the notion of the transcendental as a formal or ideal a priori is rejected 
in favour of an active and productive (machinic) field from which all such 
transcendent abstractions (e.g. significations, representations, etc.) are merely 
extracted. Such a field is immanent to its processes of libidinal production, and is thus 
never broader than that which it conditions. This machinic manifestation of the 
transcendental is patently indebted to Deleuze and Guattari's claim that the Oedipus 
complex is virtual, but that this virtuality is a "derived effect" of the actual, always 
dependent upon "a state of forces that is changing, yet always actual and 
contemporary, within anoedipal desiring-production", and thus should not be 
considered "in isolation, abstractly, independently of the actual factor that coexists 
with it and to which it reacts" (Anti-Oedipus, pp. 140-141). By the stage of 
Philosophy II, however, Laruelle comes to view the very notion of a transcendental 
field as emblematic of the philosophical conflation of the real and the whole (the 
basic manoeuvre of philosophical transcendence), striving instead to articulate a "new 
mutation" of the transcendental method that would give it "an absolute, and no longer 
relative or ideal, character [ ... ] an Absolute which would no longer be confused with 
a Whole, a Total, a Collection, a Set, a Body, a Plane", depriving it of all residual 
transcendence (Le principe de minorite, p. 13). This is made clearest though in Theory 
of Strangers, the first book of the Philosophy III period, in which he argues that 
schizoanalvsis as the accentuation of "the immanence of desire, desiring-production, 
and the syntax of difference [ ... ] ultimately of functioning and production privileged 
at the expense of interpretation and meaning", is little more than "a brilliant revenge 
of philosophy over analysis, a reaffirmation of Spinoza and Nietzsche against Freud 
and Lacan, and by consequence a reduction to philosophical desire as auto-position 
and the amphibological confusion, however 'differentiated' it might be, of the real and 
desire" (Théorie des Etrangers: Science des hommes, democratie, non-psychanalyse 
[Paris: Editions Kimé, 1995], p. 278, my translation). 
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accordance with the functionality rather than the signification of this 
philosophy, without ever suppressing or abrogating the latter. What 
Laruelle sees in Nietzsche is not a truth, an mterpretat10n, or e:7en a 
perspective, but a style of thinking, homing in on what B1swas 
Mellamphy describes as "the operat10n of an elementary and 
fundamentally non-signifying force-mechamcs that activates the 
virulence of Nietzsche's thought".72 
At the same time though, there is still a sense of philosophical 
sufficiency here that Laruelle would subsequently try to expunge an 
implicit belief that philosophical syntax, m a specifically machm1c form,
is up to the task of resisting transcendent codification. Indeed, the claims
he makes here are heavily reminiscent of Deleuze and Guattar1 s notion
of a non-signifying "language of decoded flows" counterposed agamst "a 
signifier that strangles and overcodes the flows" .73 In the end, the appeal
made to Nietzsche-thought within Nietzsche contra Heidegger 1s still an
appeal to a certain kind of philosophical authenticity, a more essential
usage of Nietzsche mobilized against all trad1t10nal interpretations of his 
work. And Nietzsche's vaunted conceptual constructivism or 
heterogenesis (and its aforementioned Deleuzian formalizat10n) still finds
itself caught within a covert foundationalism that would, in its 
identification of being with difference or becommg (a flux to which no 
concept can ever remain adequate), still in the end make specific claims 
regarding the nature of thought and its relation to the real. As Laruelle 
himself would later write, "[ f]iction represents the real for another f1ct10n, 
the real represents fiction for another real: this is the Nietzschean way of 
saying that the real is fictional and the fictional real" .
74 
72 Biswas Mellamphy, 'Nietzsche's Political Materiali_sm', p. 78. .  
73 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 261. Decodmg, w1thm a schizoanalytic 
context, is not a form of interpretation: it does not involve "the discovery of the secret 
of such and such a code", but instead "must undo the codes so as to attain the 
quantitative and qualitative flows of libido that traverse dreams, fantasies, and 
pathological formations as well as myth, tragedy, and the social formations , eliciting
that which "is uncodable by virtue of its polymorphism and its polyvocity (Anti-
Oedipus, pp. 331-332). 
74 Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, p. 228. 
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Universality without totalization 
Nietzschean constructivism is relativist, inasmuch as it purports to refuse 
to judge certain concepts as having a greater claim to veracity vis-à-vis 
the real (thus rendering all concepts ultimately fictive ), Jbut like all prior 
phI1osoph1es, 1t 1s relativist m the bad - Greek, sophistic, and empiricist 
- sense of the word", whereas "true relativity is based in an absolute and 
unsurpassable (finite) experience".75 In order to articulate a genuinely 
non~philosophical account of style then, we must endeavour to equally 
av01d both the treatment of style in philosophy as an index of its capacity 
to commumcate the truth of the real and as an index of the equivalence 
between the real and its Other, such that all concepts are effectively 
equalized. Accordmgly, what I wish to argue is that such an account 
would instead necessitate the treatment of each and every philosophical 
style as individuated without (in)difference, and yet identical in the last 
instance to the (finite, immanent) real. "Non-philosophy's plasticity and 
style require both an ongoing labor of internal interpretation and that of 
taste or affect, i.e. the sensibility of solitary terms". 76 
One of the central (and oft-repeated) principles of non-philosophy 
1s that we should not and cannot abandon or negate philosophy proper. 
There is no "pure" non-philosophy, for it is always a usage of 
philosophical materials - but a usage in which these materials undergo "a 
transcendental change of function", stripped of their pretensions to 
sufficiency.77 This is a performative, rather than empirical or positivist 
usage, "a theoretical-contemplative posture and practice" that "neither 
thinks nor describes that which is", but rather "produces/describes - in 
the same gesture - new object-statements".78 In place of the philosophical 
conception of style, whereby the latter serves as a mere tool of 
ornamentation or persuasion, either obscuring or illuminating the real in 
some fashion, we have instead a unilateralization of style, which 
manifests the real without making any pretences of speaking to it, 
determiningit, or transforming it. Style is here rendered an inert a priori 
material - an a priori of a specifically non-philosophical type, which 
gives the world (and the experience that comes with it) without 
75 Laruelle, A Biography of Ordinary Man, pp. 17-18. 
76 Laruelle, Dictionary of Non-Philosophy, p. 128. 
77 Ibid., p. 13. 
78 Laruelle, En tant qu 'un, p. 194. We have already seen that this approach to writing 
1s present (and explicitly formulated) even within the Philosophy I period. 
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insinuating that this world is ever convertible with the real (although it is 
identical with it in the last mstance ). This 1s an entuely positive, 
immanent and irreflective presentation of style, in which "language has 
no other 'function but description, it no longer has a constitutive 
function": there is no truth that hides behind it, waiting to be 
communicated or dissimulated; there is only its identity in the last 
instance with the real.80 
Laruelle refers to this as philo-fiction, an experimental usage (and 
experience) of philosophical materials that is not false or illusory (in the 
manner of "fiction" in its everyday sense), but 1s mstead wholly pos1t1ve, 
irreducible to any such dichotomy of truth and falsity. Philo-fiction is 
exemplary of the non-philosophical transformation (rather than 
nullification) of philosophical materials: never seeking to destroy the 
latter, but instead trying to put into work a "remodellmg or rect1f1cat1on 
of writing", involving "a 'total' elaboration not only of thought, theme, or 
concept, but of its form or expression" and "a coherent remodellmg .. of 
the formulations of 'literary genres' and 'styles"'. 81 It effects a mutatmn 
of these manifold philosophical genres and styles, without ever 
submitting them to the exigencies of the philosophical logos. It claims not 
to produce more philosophies; rather, it utilizes these matenals m order to 
79 Although in the Philosophy II period he treats this unilateral viewpoint on 
philosophical materials - the Vision-in-One, as he often refers to it - as a specifically 
scientific modality of thought, Laruelle would later come to reject this vestigial 
positivism, conceiving of non-philosophy instead as a heterogeneous and non-
hierarchical conjugation and transformation of various disciplines alongside
philosophy. Most pertinently here, Laruelle recently proposes a non-philosophical 
effectuation of aesthetics that deprives the latter of its philosophical sufficiency (and 
thus presumed primacy) in relation to artistic practices, suspending the former's 
decisional structuration and codification of the latter such that 1t might become 
possible to incorporate philosophical materials into an artistic. or (non-aesthetic
method that is irreducible to the totalizing strictures of the philosophical logos. Art is 
the world without the world, the entire world but without its over-determining 
concept" (François Laruelle, Photo-Fiction, a Non-Standard Aesthetics, trans. by 
Drews. Burk [Minneapolis, MN: Univocal, 2012], p. 63). Such a method 1s very 
much congruent with the unilateralization of style described in this article. For more 
on the (non-)aesthetic component of non-philosophical thought, see also: Thomas 
Sutherland, "Art, Philosophy, and Non-Standard Aesthetics", in Aesthetics After 
Finitude, ed. by Baylee Brits, Prudence Gibson, and Amy Ireland (Melbourne: 
re.press, 2016), pp. 53-68. 
80 Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, p. 48. 
81 Laruelle, En tant qu 'un, p. 181. 
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establish "a theoretical and practical programme of production of text-
objects, which is no longer guided by the norm of what exists", arising 
from the real, instead of attempting to seize the real as an object of 
thought. 
This performativity is central to the non-philosophical project, 
hoping to ensure not only that this project can never be completed, but 
that there is no possible telos toward which this project orients itself. In 
contradistinction to the Nietzschean/Deleuzian image of conceptual 
heterogenesis, whereby true philosophizing demands a philosophy-in-
becoming that corresponds to the infinite speed of thought (and prevents 
the former's ossification), there is no sense of compulsion or imperative 
here: for sure, there is a labour involved in non-philosophical thinking, 
but this labour is not demanded by the real (for it is in no way 
incomplete), nor has any effect upon the real (for it can only proceed 
unilaterally from the real). Style, then, would be grasped here in a non-
instrumental manner: when stripped of all claims to adequation, style 
does not serve a purpose nor convey a meaning, but simply functions, 
acting as an a priori condition for experience without ever purporting to 
exhaust this experience. Put bluntly, non-philosophy insists that no 
modality of thought should be judged as superior or inferior to another, 
for they are all incapable of apprehending the real, and yet at the same 
time are all identical with the real (viz. the finite individual; the 
"ordinary" person) in the last instance.82 
This is the "democratizing" function of non-philosophy: as John 6 
Maoilearca writes, whilst Laruelle is sympathetic to the aims of the 
philosophers of difference in their desire to flatten metaphysical 
hierarchies, he also acknowledges the difficulty of "practicing tolerance 
towards all forms of thought and even of practicing practice (rather than 
taking the proclamation of its use as equivalent to its actual use)", in the 
82 Laruelle's idiosyncratic usage of the term "ordinary" is reflective of his desire to 
identify a mode of thought that is wholly immanent (albeit in a finite, rather than 
absolute manner), and as such, can make no recourse to transcendence in any form. 
The ordinary "resists all historical and cultural, linguistic or sexual, etc., 
characterization" (Laruelle, A Biography of Ordinary Man, p. 42). Against the pure 
immanence posited by Deleuze, writes Marjorie Gracieuse, "Laruelle opposes the 
radical primacy of individuals' singular identity, as first and ultimate flesh that forever 
remains hermetic to, and not affected by, philosophy's various modes of idealisation 
of matter" ('Laruelle Facing Deleuze: Immanence, Resistance and Desire', in Laruelle 
and Non-Philosophy, ed. by John Mullarkey and Anthony Paul Smith [Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2012], pp. 42-59 (p. 43)). 
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conviction that to achieve such a levelling demands not just lip service, 
but a rigorous and continuous performative labour.83 Philosophy, as 
already observed, aspires to be a universal language by which all regional 
knowledges would be mediated, but it does this by ensuring its capacity 
for "translating its own systems into one another, and thereby putting an 
end to their mutual incomprehension without putting an end to their 
differences and, in a certain manner, to their inexchangeability".84 By 
positing itself as this universal mediator, philosophy maintains a 
hierarchy between itself and the extra-philosophical knowledges that it 
circumscribes and appropriates, even whilst it remains dependent upon 
these apparent exteriorities. In other words, this universal 1:1ediation is 
achieved by imposing the category of difference (which 1s always a 
specific difference) upon these knowledges, pitting them against each 
other whilst simultaneously maintaining their exchangeabihty or 
indifference (the genus that encompasses these differences) on 
philosophical terms. 
We have already considered, albeit somewhat cursorily, the ways 
in which this equivalence manifests in relation to style. On the one hand, 
the communicational imperative of philosophy - that is, its inherent need 
to transmit meaning, to blend aletheia and logos - ensures that style will 
always be a matter of concern for philosophy, even if it is usually 
sidelined as a quasi-philosophical concern marginal to the essential 
functions of philosophizing (the typical place for rhetoric within post-
mediaeval Western philosophy), for the discipline will always have to 
grapple with the problem of how best to communicate its ostensible truth. 
On the other hand though, this very problem makes apparent that 
philosophy can only speak of or to the real through the medium of its own 
syntaxes and idioms - which comprise a seemingly endless variety of 
stylistic differences, all of which though are ultimately still philosophical 
in nature - and as such, the truth of which it claims to commumcate will 
83 John 6 Maoilearca, "Laruelle's 'Criminally Performative' Thought: On Doing and 
Saying in Non-Philosophy", Performance Philosophy l (2015), 161-167 (p. 162). 
Beginning with the Philosophy III period, Laruelle would come to descnbe non-
philosophy as a radical and immanent theory of democracy, positing it as 'the only 
programme that is itself practically democratic because it is theoretically democratic, 
and which defines a democratic opening distinct from any political plane' Thèorie 
des Etrangers, p. 115), hoping to bring peace to thought through the flattening of all 
hierarchies and cessation of all conflicts. 
84 Laruelle, The Non-Philosophy Project, p. 103. 
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always involve the undecidable suturing of two terms into a merely 
apparent one. Again, a mixed or unitary form, a "hallucination of the 
real". 85 In short, the various distinctions that arise from the consideration 
of style (e.g. clear or opaque, literal or figural, essayistic or aphoristic, 
etc.) enable and perpetuate the auto-productive and circular repetition of 
difference that ensures philosophy will never actually grasp the 
desideratum that it seeks (viz. the real qua object as apart from any such 
stylistic accoutrements), and will instead remain mired in endless stylistic 
(as well as argumentative) disputation.86 
The philosophical consideration of style, then, does acknowledge 
the importance of these stylistic differences, but it does so not in the name 
of a genuine universality, relativity, or generality, but instead in that of a 
universal differentiation under the aegis of philosophical decision - a 
totalizing indifference. 87 Non-philosophy seeks "a language that would 
finally be genuinely universal", rather than a logos that desires or 
presupposes its own universality.88 In order to achieve this, individual 
styles must be treated entirely as such, individual (in the most literal 
sense: indivisible) without remainder, entirely unexchangeable. This 
unilateralization of style frees it from the constraints of the philosophical 
logos, for it no longer must comport itself in line with the expectations of 
philosophy - in particular, it no longer need make any claim in regard to 
the real, and thus comparisons between different styles cannot be made 
on the basis of veracity or adequation.89 There is no exchangeability in 
85 Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, p. 29. 
86 
"The Greco-Occidental style wears itself out in the infinitely varied practice of the 
unity of contraries, their co-belonging, their simultaneity in general and not only in its 
dialectical form" (Laruelle, Le principe de minorite, p. 68). One might say that if there 
is a universal style of philosophy as such (i.e. the style of all philosophically possible 
styles), it is precisely this formal capacity to differentiate from itself whilst still 
conforming to its foundational invariances. 
87 
"Difference repeats the primitive couples of philosophy with the difference that it 
repeats them and wants them in their essence as couple. What it affirms is no longer 
the terms themselves, with their determinate cultural and historical content, suffering 
their contradiction or their combat as a necessary evil or a strange fatality. To the 
contrary, Difference affirms the superiority of their combat, of their coupling and 
hierarchy over the content of the embattled terms" (Laruelle, Philosophies of 
Difference, p. 8). 
88 Laruelle, The Non-Philosophy Project, p. 99. 
89 Amongst many other possible connections, we might briefly note the consonances 
here with the rather contentious écriture feminine advocated by philosophers such as 
Luce Irigaray, amongst others - a style of writing that "resists and explodes every 
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this mode of thought, only the identity of all styles with the real in the last 
instance: an identity without hierarchy, without disputat10n, proceeding 
from the radical finitude of the real qua the "ordinary" individual. This 
identity in the last instance is not a synthesis, a sublation, a reconc1hat10n, 
or a totalization; it instead precedes (in a transcendental rather than 
temporal manner) any such conjunction. 
Conclusion 
For non-philosophy, declares Katerina Kolozova, "the. truth of ourselves 
is never ours, whereas what is ours . . . 1s always indifferent to any 
truth" .90 Philosophy posits truth - the real - as an object, somethmg to be 
grasped ( even if this object comes in the forr.n of a transcendental subJect, 
etc.), whereas non-philosophy posits the ordinary human as the necessary 
but insufficient condition for this truth: the radically fm1te md1v1dual who 
determines such truth in the last instance, but is never affected by or 
convertible with it. To think non-philosophically it is necessary to engage 
with the problem of style, and to make usage of philosophical styles, but 
to do so upon a terrain that is no longer philosophical The concept of 
non-philosophy requires the practical product10n of new styhst1c and 
literary codes new 'forms' of which we do not yet know what they are 
' 1 . " 91 
and which will perhaps be of great freedom ... and comp ex1ty . 
With this in mind, we can understand why Laruelle would come to 
abandon the notion of "Nietzsche-thought" as the dominant motif of his 
project: whilst it does in one sense closely resemble the unilaterahzat10n 
of style described above, it particularizes this N1etzschean style of 
thought in order to valorize it over and above other forms of philosophy. 
Throughout Laruelle's Philosophy I penod, Nietzsche-thought_ remams 
the privileged modality by which difference must be cogmzed and 
firmly established form, figure, idea or concept", and which "cannot be upheld as a 
thesis cannot be the object of a position" (This Sex Which is Not One, trans. by 
Catherine Porter and Carolyn Burke [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985], p. 
79). Unlike Laruelle, however, who conceives of non-philosophical style as 
proceeding from a real that is devoid of all adjectival description, Irigaray s 
strategically mimetic affirmation of a feminine style of wntmg proceeds ma much 
more specified manner from the corporeality of the occluded female body. 
90 Katerina Kolozova, "The Figure of the Stranger: A Poss1b1hty for Transcendental 
Minimalism or Radical Subjectivity", Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory, 11:3 
(2011), 59-64 (p. 64). 
91 Laruelle, En tant qu 'un, p. 182. 
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actualized, and whilst he certainly makes overtures toward a more 
generalized, non-hierarchical conception of philosophy, overall he 
produces a quasi-system amenable to philosophical reason and discourse, 
positing Nietzsche-thought as a better style of thought, a better 
philosophy.92 In order to suspend the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy, 
such comparison, which feeds into "a permanent activity of violent force 
or arbitrary decision", must first be put to rest.93 
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle propounds that "language to be good 
must be clear", for "speech which fails to convey a plain meaning will 
fail to do just what speech has to do", arguing that effective 
communication should be neither exceedingly obvious (for then such 
communication would not be necessary in the first place), nor 
unnecessarily obfuscatory (for this will just puzzle, rather than 
enlighten).94 This assumes, however, that the primary function of 
language is the transmission of a message, and style is merely the 
medium by which this message is most efficaciously delivered. What I 
am proposing here instead is not merely a reversal of these terms (such 
that it would be the stylistic, tonal, rhetorical, etc. elements of 
communication that precede or determine the message) but a total 
suspension (without liquidation) of the problematic of content: again, a 
style without substance, in that it is no longer placed in a reversible or 
reciprocal relation with semantic content, but in a unilateral relation of 
causality proceeding from the real. This non-philosophical usage of style 
is reminiscent of Marshall McLuhan's famous example of the electric 
lightbulb (which Deleuze and Guattari cite in reference to their 
aforementioned conception of a decoded, non-signifying language) - a 
"medium without a message" - in that it is intended to produce material 
92 In regard to such overtures, we might cite, for instance, his observation that ' [a] 
quotation has never proved anything, especially in the case of Nietzsche', noting that 
it is always possible to use such quotations in order to 'make him serve two opposing 
theses, or two divergent political tendencies', namely both fascism and its subversion 
(Laruelle, Nietzsche contre Heidegger, pp. 140-141). Cf. Laruelle's foreword to 
Textual Machines, in which he describes quotation as "a repetition that sometimes -
but not always - borders on parody and mimesis", and as such, "had to give way to 
games that generalized it and thus rendered it impracticable in its strict form" 
(Machines textuelles, p. 8). 
93 Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, p. 19, translation altered. 
94 Aristotle, Rhetoric, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume Two, ed. by 
Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 2152-2269 (p. 
2239). 
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effects without transmitting a semantic code.95 Perhaps more than any 
other element of philosophical discourse, style allows us to imagine a 
transformation of philosophical materials whereby form entirely 
coincides with function. 
This is in large part, it would seem, the intention of Laruelle's own 
writings: as Smith would have it, Laruelle "deploys certain forms of 
syntax and writing conventions throughout his work that flow from the 
principle that non-philosophy does what it says and says what it does" .96 
It is in this context of style that we might understand Laruelle's own 
proclamation that non-philosophy "is the authentic, not alienated, concept 
of 'popular philosophy' and of anti-vulgarization", and his frequent 
appeals (especially in his earlier work) to the notion of an "ordinary" 
thought counterposed against the elitism of Western philosophical 
thought proper.97 Philosophical style, and the various hermeto-logical 
techniques that accompany it, operates through an economy of scarcity, 
ensuring that its expression is never truly spontaneous, but is always 
mediated by a long-congealed corpus of discursive rules and expectations 
( even when it espouses pretensions toward a "plain" language - e.g. 
much of analytic philosophy - this still implies a necessary adherence to 
such formalisms98) intended to regulate the transmission of a truth to 
which philosophy supposes itself as having privileged access. By refusing 
95 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1964), p. 8. 
96 Smith, Laruelle, p. 49. 
97 Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, p. 28. 
98 For instance, see Sandra Laugier's remarks regarding "the refusal, shared by 
analytic and Continental philosophy, of the procedures of ordinary language 
philosophy", which she considers in turn to be a "refusal of language's publicness, 
which we so easily hide under a mythology of privacy" - although her observations 
here touch upon very important concerns regarding the audience that philosophy 
presumes to address ( and the universality that it tends to claim for itself), she makes 
this proposition of an ordinary language philosophy in order to "recover language, 
and the real along with it" (Why We Need Ordinary Language Philosophy, trans. by 
Daniela Ginsburg [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013], pp. 120-121). 
That is to say, Laugier conceives of the act of bringing language into question, and 
specifically of introducing into philosophy the question of the ordinary (the "real 
immanence of ordinary language", as she describes it) as providing a means of 
communicating the real, tacitly locating a moment of transcendence within this field 
of immanence whereby the real comes to be accessible and communicable through a 
specific modality of language ( even if the formal parameters of this modality remain 
mutable), furnishing a mixed form of language and the real. 
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this communicational imperative, non-philosophy hopes to liberate itself 
from this economy, emphasizing instead the experiential possibilities 
accessible to everyone when our thought is no longer beholden to 
philosophical stnctures of style, and their demand for adequation. In such 
a usage, philosophy becomes non-philosophy's instrument qua absolute 
experience, sufficient m its order, and enjoys itself without wondering if 
1t 1s useful and responsible". 99 
99 Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, p. 225. 
